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11 Introduction
This note provides a complement to the empirical part of Couprie, Peluso, Trannoy (2009), hereafter
CPT (2009). It aims at providing, on French data year 2000, a robustness check for the non-parametric
analysis. Under CPT (2009) assumptions, the concavity of the public and the private sharing functions
with respect to household expenditures implies that intra-household inequality is not worse in poor
households than in rich households. The public sharing function concavity corresponds to the shape
of household public good consumption, such as housing, with respect to total household expenditures.
The private sharing function concavity corresponds to the shape of private expenditures of the ￿domi-
nated￿ individual in the family when household expenditures increases, where the dominated is de￿ned
as the individual, male or female, who has the lowest share of household private expenditures. The
consequence of the non rejection of concavity of both functions is that intra-household inequality can
be ignored to elaborate Lorenz income distribution comparisons on the basis of the sole observation
of household incomes.
Under collective household rationality (Chiappori and Ekeland, 2006), a parametric estimation of
the intra-household sharing rule is proposed, using clothes as assignable goods and some additionnal
assumptions. The quadratic speci￿cation presents the advantage of oﬀering a reasonnable trade-oﬀ to
deal with a limited sample size and keeping some ￿exibility of the functionnal form necessary to realize
a concavity test. The identi￿cation method for the individual share of household private expenditures
is in the line of Browning and al., 1994, or more recently of Bourguignon and al., 2009. The private
sharing function ensues in a straightforward way. Then, parametric global concavity tests are applied
against global parametric alternatives.
2 Framework
When modeling household consumption behaviour, collective rationnality is a reasonnable assumption
to make (Chiappori, 1988; Apps and Rees, 1988; Chiappori and Ekeland, 2006). Rank tests, realized
on demand systems, usually do not reject the collective rationnality against broader alternatives for
couples of western countries (Browning and Chiappori, 1998). Assuming collective rationnality is not
only in line with empirical evidence but also advantageous. Under some restrictions on individual
preferences, detailed in Chiappori and Ekeland (2009), the household decision-making process can
be interpreted in a decentralised way where household members ￿rst decide a share of expenditures
then take individual decisions given the sharing rule. This sharing rule, which occurs to be related to
2the balance of Pareto weights in the household utility function, has a natural interpretation in terms
of intra-household inequality. It cannot be directly observed in the data and needs to be identi￿ed
from the observation of household aggregate consumption. Taking the minimum share obtained by
an individual in a couple directlty gives the private sharing function which is of interest in the CPT
(2009) paper.
Under egoistic or caring preferences, the observation of an exclusive good, which is a private good
for which individual consumption is observed, allows recovering the sharing rule up to a constant.
Chiappori (1992) presents an identi￿cation proof in a context where couple￿s aggregate consumption
is observed. Browning and al. (1994) present a proof in a context where the consumption of the
exclusive good is observed in a population of couples and single individuals. In both cases, the
identi￿cation is weak as it relies on second order derivatives eﬀects. In the ￿rst case, identi￿cation
can be improved to ￿rst order derivatives eﬀects by resorting to distribution factors1. In the second
case, it is strenghtened by imposing that the female and male shares do sum up to total household
private expenditures (this restriction is not rejected in Browning and al., 1994). Finally, in the context
of exclusive good consumption, it seems essential to maintain the possibility of public consumption
within the household. It has been shown in Blundell and al. (2005) that assuming Hicksian separability
between public and private consumption is necessary to maintain identi￿cation of the sharing rule.
In the following, we propose to identify the sharing rule in the absence of price variation, by
ressorting to the observation of exclusive clothes consumption, for single individuals and couples.
Identi￿cation issues in this context are essentially presented in Bourguignon and al. (2009).
3M o d e l
We adopt the following standard assumptions required to identify the sharing rule. (i) Households
behave according to collective rationality. (ii) Preferences are egotistic or caring. (iii) Public and
private consumption are Hicksian separable in individual subutilities. (iv) Clothes expenditures is an
exclusive good. (v) Whether in a couple or not does not impact individual preferences for private
goods.
As discussed earlier, all these assumptions are quite standard in the literature, but some of them
are more questionnable than others. Assumption (iii) implies that the quantity of public good con-
sumed does only impact private good consumption via an income eﬀect. Hence, it rules out any
1Variables that aﬀect the balance of bargaining powers without aﬀecting individual preferences (see Chiappori and
al., 2002 for details). Distribution factors that are recognized to have an impact of the sharing rule in the literature are
individual indicators of the remariage opportunities, and, if exogenous, individual wage rates, and incomes.
3possible substitution or complementarity between private and public good consumption. As we will
see in the empirical analysis, disentangling private from public consumption remains arbitrary and
questionnable, we will thus provide a sensitivity analysis to tackle with this problem. One should
notice that, to our knowledge, no one except Donni (2009), has implemented a test of such an as-
sumption which is always assumed to identify the sharing rule. Assumption (iv) requires the absence
of external eﬀect due to clothes consumption in the family. Hence female clothes consumption should
not directly enter in male￿s utility function, it could only impact male￿s well-being via caring and his
partner￿s utility function. The opposite is also true. Assumption (v) is questionnable as it could be
argued that preference for clothes is related to marriage formation and/or dissolution, in such a way
that individuals who present speci￿c preferences for clothes will be observed more often in a couple
than others. The question of change in preferences due to marital status is also somehow related to
the preceeding exlusivity concern, as one might justify such a change in preference by resorting to
partner￿s preferences arguments rather than intrinsic change. Finally, we cannot provide any formal
test of any of these assumptions taken individually2. Nevertheless, the joint observation of female and
male clothes consumption, whether living single or in a couple, provides an overidentifying restric-
tion which is the occasion to check the global coherency of these identi￿cation assumptions all taken
together.
In order to select the adequate taste shifting variables, we ￿rst model a system of household public
consumption (mainly housing), G, and clothes expenditures, C, for singles. In the absence of price











sj.D2 + Xsjβsj + εsj, where j = f,m.
. (1)
Zsj and Xsj are vectors of socio-demographic covariates, which can potentially contain common or
diﬀerent variables, Y is total household expenditures and D total private expenditures: D = Y − G.
Both expenditure variables are endogenous and controled with gross household income and its squared.
For couples, the expenditure system for public and clothes expenditures is such that:

   
   










m + Xmβm + εm,
(2)
2Under assumption (i) and given the existence of z-conditional demands, a test of caring and exclusivity of goods is
proposed in Bourguignon and al. (2009). As we will see later, the implementation of this test is not possible in our case.
4where φj is the share of private expenditures devoted to individual￿s j private consumption. φ
being unobserved, it can be parametrically identi￿ed under the assumptions (i) to (v). We assume




jD2 + Sκj, (3)
where S includes covariates that in￿uence the balance of the intra-household bargaining power
but might also contain covariates explaning the observed heterogeneity in taste for clothes. Imposing
ck
j = ck
sj for j = f,m and k =1 ,2,3, allows identifying the parameters of the sharing rule, using only
one exclusive good consumption for individual being single or in a couple.
It is then possible to check, for various values of D, and especially at sample mean, whether
φf + φm = D. This does not constitue an overidenti￿cation test per se as in Bourguignon and al.
(1994), but our speci￿cation is less demanding in terms of functional speci￿cation than their approach.
Contrary to these authors, we do not rule out the linear case in specifying the model. As soon as both
male and female clothes consumption are observed for both family status, imposing the restriction
φf+φm allows identifying, in the above system, all the parameters, even in the case where Engel curves
are linear. In both cases, identi￿cation of parameters is based on non-linear estimation methods and
the presence of a global maximum should be checked by resorting to various starting values for the
p a r a m e t e r s .A se a c hm e t h o dp r e s e n t si t sa d v a n t a g e sa n dd r a w b a c k s ,w ew i l lc o m p a r et h et w oi nt h e
result section.
Finally, the concavity of the public sharing function can be checked by testing the sign of the g2
parameter. One should notice that this test is less informative than the non-parametric one as global
concavity is tested against local convexity alternatives. The private sharing function must be built in
a preliminary step by predicting, for each household, the dominated individual. The concavity test
follows straightforwardly.
4D a t a
Data are cross-sectionnal, year 2000, and come from the French Family Expenditures Survey (Enquête
Budget des Familles). Table 1 illustrates the sub-sampling process. The analysis is restricted to couples
or single individuals, households containing other adults are removed. Households with children are
usually not considered. This is because it would be harder to justify and de￿ne a public-private
good consumption separability in this case. In addition to that, children, even small, could impact
the decision process via their own preferences. With the age lower than 65, this brings us to 3323
observations. In the data, individuals also report non-assignable clothes such as presents. Restricting
5to households who report a positive expenditure in assignable clothes further downsizes the sample
by more than one third. The two last selection rules are quite costly in terms of data but they are
necessary as we do not explicitly model family labour supply decisions or corner solutions. Finally we
only keep household with full-time earners. It is indeed very likely that goods consumption and labour
supply behaviour are not separable (Browning and Meghir, 1998). This remark makes even more sense
in the case of clothes expenditures, where the separability between labour and clothes consumption is
essential to adequately identify the Engel curves and the sharing rule. One could argue that clothes
consumption is related to the labor market status because people need to be dressed adequately in
order to work. Employment and its characteristics depends on the clothes you wear and vice-versa.
Moreover, consuming clothes is also a time-consuming activity and we could suspect that controling
for the hours of work in the right hand side of the clothes consumption equation would not solve the
potential endogeneity problem of working time. Reducing the sample size tends to improve the quality
of the ￿t to the data for the speci￿cation proposed. Moreover, assumptions (iv) and (v) become much
more convincing when applied only to dual-earner couples.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics corresponding to the selected sub-sample. Three diﬀerent
distinctions between public and private consumption within the household are maintained, the ￿rst
one being more restrictive and contains also housing. It is important to notice that as this analysis is
situated in a welfare analysis perspective, imputed housing expenditure are used. They correspond to
the monetary equivalent of the ￿ow of services coming from housing, even if in practice the individual
does not pay or pay a lower rent, which is the case for landlords or subsidized housing (Driant and
Jacquot 2005). Naturally, if an imputation is realized, it comes increasing the household expenditures
as well. The third de￿nition of public expenditures is much more extensive, it includes car-related
expenditures and represents on average 50% of household expenditures. One should note that some
clothes consumption are not assignable to female or male, in which case it is aggregated into the other
private good consumed category. In all the following, in order to limit outlier problems, and to stay
comparable with the non-parametric analysis of CPT (2009), all the regressions are restricted to 2nd
to 98th percentiles of expenditures.
5R e s u l t s
Empirical analysis starts by selecting the adequate taste shifters for clothes and the public good using
single individuals. Table 3 shows the best speci￿cation obtained. Very few covariates impact clothes
consumption, the only signi￿cant variables are age and living in a big city. A system speci￿cation
is proposed, and appears to be rejected againts OLS using Hausman tests. Expenditures, which
6are endogenous, are instrumented using gross household income and its squared value. Instrumental
variable estimators are also most of the time rejected at standard threshold in the data. This could
be due to the small sample size which does not allow eﬃciency gains to show up. Homoscedasticity is
always rejected, so White￿s estimator for the variance covariance matrix is implemented. Engel curves
tend to present a positive slope but the coeﬃcients are only signi￿cant for Def2. Second order eﬀects
are never signi￿cant. Hence, with a quadratic speci￿cation, Engel curves for clothes expenditures for
males for Def2 tend to present a linearity that is statistically not rejected.
Table 4 shows the results of the estimations obtained for couples. In this case also, a system
estimation does not lead to a signi￿cant improval in the estimation. More surprisingly, this result holds
also statistically for the system female-male clothes consumption. This reduced form model allows
selecting the adequate variables and testing the global concavity of public good expenditures against
global alternative (Table 5). It occurs that concavity is never rejected for whatever the de￿nition
chosen for public expenditures and whatever we choose to restrict to the 10th to 90th percentiles
interval.
Finally, their remains to identify potential distribution factors, which are variables, speci￿ct oc o u -
ples￿ behavior, aﬀecting the decision process without aﬀecting preferences. Among widely recognized
distribution factors in the literature (for instance, Lise and Seitz (2007) and Browning and Bonke
(2006), we try age diﬀerence, education diﬀerence and income diﬀerences between spouses. In order
to control for the external opportunities of both spouses, we need to use individual incomes. But, to
remove any possible endogeneity problem related to hours of work choice in the clothes consumption
model, the wage rate variables are used instead. Naturally, for the public good consumption, the eﬀect
of the distribution factor is made anonymous (minimum or maximum of both spouses wage rates) to
test that the poorest in household tries to push public good spending since he will bene￿tm o r eo f
it in relative terms. In our data, age plays an important role on preferences, and could also impact
the bargaining process, whereas education does not seem to impact signi￿cantly clothes consumption.
Quite surprisingly compared to other results in the literature, we do not observe any statistically
signi￿cant impact of the wage rate on the consumption of the exclusive good.
In order to check the robustness of such a result, we choose to use a linear model in line with
household rationnality as it is embedded in the structural model of household behavior. This means
that the model contains interaction terms between covariates, wage rate variables, expenditure and
expenditure squared variables. Table 6 reports the resulting elasticities of clothes consumption to wage
rates (controling for total expenditures and all the covariates previously de￿ned). These are neither
signi￿cant at the 5% level. In these conditions, the existence of distribution factors in this analysis
7is far from being proven. As a consequence, we cannot implement the test of caring and exclusivity
of clothes consumption suggested by Bourguignon and al. (2009) because such a test relies is not
implementable in a unitary context (which is probably the case in these data).
Table 7 presents the estimation of the structural model (equ. 2), imposing the restriction that
the individual shares should sum up to household aggregate private expenditures. We also present
the speci￿cation of Browning and al. (1994) which allows an overidenti￿cation restriction test. In
their paper, expenditures are introduced in log in the demand function and in the female sharing rule
function. This rules out the possibility of linear Engel curves and sharing rule. One must admit that
the test of the overidenti￿cation restriction passes only at the 1% level.
On the last line, we evaluate the prediction errors at sample mean (sum of private predicted indi-
vidual expenditures in the household minus household observed private expenditures). The estimation
never deviates signi￿cantly (at a level of 5%). Table 8 presents more detailed results on the prediction
process for the private sharing function, depending on whether the shares should sum up to household
private expenditures is applied (Table 8A), or not (Table 8B).In this last case, observations leading
to negative predicted expenditures are suppressed. This leads to a limited reduction of the sample
o f1t o3 % ,e x c e p tf o rd e ￿nition 3 for which it is more severe, almost 20%. The average share of
female expenditures tends to belong to a 46-48% interval, which is quite narrow (except for de￿nition
3 in the unrestricted case where it goes up to 55%). Comparing the prediction errors, it appears that
Browning et al. (1994) method appears to be the best as it presents the lowest average prediction
error and prediction error standard deviation. Their speci￿cation imposes that the ratio of individual
expenditures to household ones should be comprised between 0 and 1. However, the last lines of Table
8A and Table 8B leads to a striking result. With Browning et al. (1994) approach, the individual who
h a st h el o w e s ts h a r ei nt h ef a m i l yi st h ef e m a l ei nm o r et h a n9 5 %o ft h ec a s e s ,a g a i n s ta￿gure which
can be comprised between 44% and 66% with the quadratic method. This 95% is much too strong to
be realistic and is clearly driven by the parametric concave shape imposed on the individual sharing
rule by Browning et al. (1994). This is a serious drawback for the concavity test that we want to
implement on the population of ￿dominated￿ individuals which require to be identi￿ed adequately.
Finally, Tables 9 and 10 present the regression and concavity test of the private sharing function.
We also check the robustness of the result when the sum of shares are not restricted to sum up to
household private expenditures. Imposing the restriction tends changes the sign of the eﬀect of the
a g eo ff e m a l e ,a g eo fm a l ea n dt h es i g n i ￿cance of wage rates and age diﬀerence eﬀects. The eﬀect of
the minimum wage in the household tends to be more precised in the case of de￿nition 1 with the
restriction and in the case of de￿nition 2 without the restriction. If overall there remains a doubt
8about the absence of a wage rate eﬀect on the private sharing function, there is absolutely no doubt
about the result of the concavity test, which is never rejected against global alternatives whatever the
de￿nition used, whatever the sample is restricted to 10 to 90th percentiles or not and whatever the
restriction on the sum of shares is imposed or not.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This note replicates the empirical analysis of the CPT (2009) paper in a quadratic demand and sharing
rule collective rationnality context. The speci￿cation and results are compared to Browning and al.
(1994) identi￿cation method. The nature of the concavity result proven in the non-parametric analysis
does not change when using this parametric alternative.
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Subsampling   
 
Original sample size   







Single headed households or couples  9962 6567 2283  1112
Without children or any other adult member  5517 2876 1645  996
Less than 65 years old  3323 1697 877  749
Consuming assignable good (clothes)    2056 886 674  496
Employment episode in the year  1329 495 462  372
Not in part-time  
(weekly hours>30 or annual hours>1500) 
1021 373 355  316
French Family Expenditure Survey, year 2000 
 
 








Household before tax income (100€/year)  384.25
(197.01)




Household’s total expenditures incl. imputations (100€/year)  333.73
(165.84)




Public 1: Housing, water, electricity (100€/year)  73.28
(26.01)




Public 2: Public1, furnitures, HH services (100€/year)  101.56
(59.52)




Public 3: Public2, Car-related expenditures (100€/year)  161.44
(89.17)




Assignable clothes (% of HH expenditures) (€/year)  1762.18
(1582.4)




Unassignable clothes  (€/year)*  863.86
(2713.55)




Big city  0.1823
(0.3866)
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When necessary, total expenditures are instrumented using gross household income and its squared value. The appropriate estimator is 
selected for each case using Hausman specification tests. It occurs that on this sub-sample, in most of the cases, the instrume ntal 
variables estimator does not improve the estimations compared to a simple OLS one, expect for male public expenditures using definition 
1. A joint system (SUR or 3SLS) estimation is also always rejected at standard levels against the OLS specification.  This could be due to 



























































































































         
PUBLIC             
Intercept  -21.9794 
(16.4194) 
  -50.8064 
(34.2546) 







  0.2647 *** 
(0.0896) 








  -0.00009 
(0.000104) 
  -0.00035 *** 
(0.000128) 
 
Age Female  0.2037 
(1.3422) 
  2.7743 
(2.1668) 




2 0 . 27 5 2 
(1.6805) 
  -2.5817 
(2.8643) 
  3.1993 
(3.6303) 
 
Age Male  2.3409 
(1.3336) 
  -0.2985 
(2.5829) 




2  -3.0334 * 
(1.6483) 
  0.0375 
(3.3426) 
  -4.8339 
(4.2811) 
 
Big city  16.5144 *** 
(4.0837) 
  20.8912 ** 
(8.3143) ** 
  -5.6760 
(10.341) 
 
Paris region   -2.9836 
(2.6108) 




wage Rate in the HH 
0.2671 
(0.2653) 
  0.6781 
(0.5148) 




wage  rate in the HH 
1.0935 * 
(0.5728) 
  2.4570 * 
(1.3301) 






Table 5: Concavity test of public expenditures for couples 
 
Parameter  Stderr Pvalue Pvalue negativity 
DEF1  -0,00008  0,000015 <0,0001 1,0000 
DEF2  -0,00009  0,000104 0,3868 0,8066 
DEF3  -0,00035  0,000128 0,0062 0,9969 
Expenditures belong to P10-P90  
DEF1  -0,00001  0,000172 0,9536 0,5232 
DEF2  0,00022  0,000305 0,4707 0,2354 













































* Covariates are built as the outer product of covariates of Table 4. This model encompasses the structural one presented in Table 7 





Table 7: Structural model estimation for couples preferences for clothes and sharing rule * 
  DEF1  DEF2  DEF3  BBCL94  DEF 2 
PREFERENCE FEMALES         













































PREFERENCE MALES        









































FEMALE SHARING RULE          

































































Difference in spouses wage rates 
(female – male) 
      -0.0335 
(0.0714) 
Difference in spouses age        -0.0044 
(0.0106) 
UNCONSTRAINED MODEL         
Pvalue of the overidentifying 
restriction test 
      0.0464 
Sum of shares - HH private 










* See Table 3. BBCL94 refers to Browning et al. (1994) specification for demand for clothes (where expenditures and demand are in 
logarithm) and the sharing rule (where distribution factors are defined in difference and expenditures are in log). DEF1 to DEF3 
correspond to 3 different distinctions between household public and private consumptions (narrow range to wide range of goods),  16 
 
Table 8: Female sharing rule prediction results (*) 
 
With the restriction  
sum of shares=private HH expenditures 
DEF 1  DEF 2  DEF3  BCCL94 DEF 2 
















































        
Without the restriction  
sum of shares=private HH expenditures 
     




























































Number of observations  354  350  291   
% lost due to negative predicted share  1%  3%  19%  0% 
  
(*) We recall that private expenditures were divided by 100.17 
 
Table 9A: Private sharing function (share of the ‘dominated’) – with imposing the restriction 
PRIVATE SHARING  DEF 1  DEF 2  DEF 3  BCCL94 DEF2 































































|Log wage rates difference|        1.0134 * 
(0.5689) 
|Age difference|        -0.0621 
(0.0905) 
   
 
Table 9B: Private sharing function (share of the ‘dominated’) – without imposing the restriction 
PRIVATE SHARING  DEF 1  DEF 2  DEF 3  BCCL94 DEF2 































































|Log wage rates difference|        10.8553*** 
(2.1312) 
|Age difference|        -0.3864 * 
(0.2342) 
   18 
 
Table 10: Concavity test of private expenditures of the ‘dominated’ 
 
With the restriction 
Parameter  Stderr Pvalue negativity 
DEF1  -0,00008  0,000034 0,9923 
DEF2  -0,00022  0,00004 1,0000 
DEF3  -0,0016  0,00008 1,0000 
BCCL94 DEF2  -0,00004  0,000014 0,9979 
Expenditures belong to P10-P90  
DEF1  0,000112  0,000086 0,0964 
DEF2  0,000036  0,000074 0,3133 
DEF3  0,0000042  0,000158 0,4894 
BBCL94 DEF2  -0,00007  0,000025 0,9974 
Without the restriction 
DEF1  -0,00043  0,000037 1,0000 
DEF2  -0,00138  0,000052 1,0000 
DEF3  -0,00347  0,000053 1,0000 
BCCL94 DEF2  -0,00004  0,000059 0,7511 
Expenditures belong to P10-P90  
DEF1  -0,00047  0,000105 1,0000 
DEF2  -0,00143  0,000124 1,0000 
DEF3  -0,00373  0,000156 1,0000 
BBCL94 DEF2  -0,00031  0,000107 0,9981 
 